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During the second week of March 2011 the members of the ZiF Research Group on ‘Communicating 
Disaster’, which started its work in October 2010, came together for their usual jour fi xe. Based on 
reports and governmental documents they discussed various communicative aspects of the disaster 
that hit New Orleans as a result of Hurricane Katrina. On March 11, two days after this meeting, the 
fi rst news arrived with reports of a severe earthquake, a tsunami and subsequent technical problems 
in a nuclear power plant in Japan. The research group was unsure how to respond. Some of its mem-
bers thought it would be awkward just to continue with the group’s work schedule; for them it would 
be a strange dissociation to privately follow the events in Japan through the media and to disregard 
them as a topic for a research group that deals with the communicative aspects of disasters. Other 
members pointed out that serious research needs time and that any ‘quick and dirty’ treatment of 
the events in Japan, dramatic as they may be, is in danger of lacking academic rigour. Eventually the 
group agreed that its members would be invited to contribute short statements with their responses 
to the catastrophic events in Japan. These statements vary in many respects; they range from very 
personal accounts to short analytic considerations. Most of them reveal at which point in time during 
the unfolding disaster they were written, and in that sense these statements are witness accounts. At 
the same time these notes are more than just witness documents, since they contain the observations 
and refl ections of academics from a variety of disciplines who all have expertise in the communi-
cative analysis of disasters.
Jörg Bergmann
The earthquake, the tsunami and the nuclear 
meltdown in Japan
Responses from members of the ‘Communicating Disaster’ research group 
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Disaster as media loops
“Whatever we know about our society, or indeed about the world in which we live, we know through 
the mass media”—this statement by Niklas Luhmann, wrong as it is in many respects, is certainly 
true for disasters of which we do not have fi rst-hand experience. Whatever we know about the earth-
quake east of the Peninsula of To¯hoku, about the tsunami that struck Japan minutes after that 
quake, and about the subsequent events in the nuclear power plant near Fukushima, we know 
through TV-pictures, radio reports, news coverage and the internet. These media reports soon triggered 
public and scientifi c discussions about the technical and social implications of the Japanese disaster. 
But these discussions about the events in Japan disregard the fact that they are entirely based on 
media reports and on their constructions of the disaster.
In the hours and days after the events in Japan when these notes were written all TV channels 
interrupted their scheduled programs and virtually turned into 24 hour news channels. Media coverage 
of the tsunami on all TV channels mainly consisted of a series of unconnected fi lm snippets. This 
snippet format may be accounted for by certain production constraints (legal and copyright regula-
tions, technical limitations) or aesthetic conventions (raw footage as indication of live-ness). The fi lm 
snippets usually are characterized by a lack of narrativity, and they focus on strange, spectacular or 
touching scenes: the tsunami wave sweeping away greenhouses, cars adrift, a man weeping. Through 
the snippet format these scenes are isolated from their local and temporal contexts, so much so that 
some scenes from other earthquakes (Kobe) were also included without proper explanation. The spec-
tacular becomes the dominant, if not exclusive meaning of the pictures.
The most striking feature of the early media coverage of the events in Japan is that the fi lm snip-
pets are broadcast and repeated in changed order, so that viewers encounter the same snippets (some-
times with a new commentary voice-over) over and over again even when switching between TV 
channels or during the hourly news bulletin. Obviously, the endless loops of fi lm snippets are caused 
by the TV channels’ ambition to stay on air in the event of a disaster despite of the lack of up-to-date 
footage. Since there is no ‘new’ footage, the available snippets are broadcasted ‘anew’. Thus, viewers 
fi nd themselves caught in a trap: Since there is no ‘new’ news it appears meaningless to continue 
viewing, but together with the projection of a possibly dramatic future the very lack of new informa-
tion is perpetually generating the motive to continue viewing. Spectators keep on watching, but 
since there is no new news, watching becomes looking and looking turns into staring. The scenes 
become senseless, merely spectacular events, leaving the viewers mesmerized and paralyzed. While 
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disasters are events which stimulate the demand for new and up-to-date information, the delivery of 
no-new news entices the viewer to stay on or frantically switch news channels.
The situation just described is just a single manifestation of a general feature of disaster com-
munication. Disasters are events during which information and its communication—its availability, 
news value, trustworthiness, reliability—become crucial. Every disaster leads to a dramatic increase 
in the demand for and at the same time a notorious lack of new information. To distant spectators 
and media recipients this discrepancy just matters for reasons of their curiosity, sympathy and pity; 
for relief and emergency organizations, which depend on reliable information in order to take quick 
action, the lack of current information is a problem; but for disaster victims who are very often cut 
off from communication networks the (un-)availability of relevant information may be existential.
Experiencing the Sendai earthquake while travelling in China
My wife who is Japanese and me experienced the Sendai earthquake while travelling in China. We 
were sitting in a plane from Frankfurt to Beijing when the earthquake and the following tsunami 
were devastating parts of coastal Honshu. This account was written retrospectively two weeks after 
the earthquake before being back to Germany.
We arrived in Beijing without knowing about the earthquake and spent half a day exploring 
the city. Taking a better hotel with internet connection, I found out via the news portal Spiegel Online 
that a severe accident had happened. Spiegel reported that the Tokyo Tower was deformed, so that I 
assumed that the epicenter of the earthquake was in the Tokyo region where my sister-in-law’s family 
lives. We got extremely nervous, hectic and sad—both for our family but also for the assumed disaster 
created in such densely populated area. Using skype, my wife tried to call her father who lives 600 km 
south of Tokyo—in suburban Osaka. First the telephone network did not work, probably due to over-
load. After some minutes my wife fi nally reached her father who was unaffected by the earthquake. 
He had already spoken to my sister-in-law’s family who suffered from the traffi c breakdown in 
the Tokyo area but was fortunately not physically harmed. Their house was not damaged either. How-
ever, others’ houses in their suburb were affected, as we found out later in Japanese TV. Following 
that, I sent a mail to our sons (16 and 18 years old) who are living in Bonn with us, informing them 
that we arrived safely and that our closer Japanese family was not physically affected. While writing 
that mail, I confused Japan with China when mentioning the place where we arrived. This created 
some confusion and worries among our kids and German friends. After the kids expressed their sur-
prise via email, I corrected my mistake.
Our hotel in Beijing allowed receiving Japanese TV, NHK, the public national TV program which 
is typically of rather good quality. We watched through the next couple of hours this program, but 
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there was little clear information. There were frequent announcements by the government’s speaker 
(wearing a blue color shirt). We saw a snippet many times that night which showed how a tsunami 
wave was destroying a village at the coast and great number of green houses around the village (taken 
obviously from the air). Later on more of this type of snippets could be seen. In the following days, 
NHK also presented some aftershocks by allowing its viewers to experience shaking earth mediated 
by a camera positioned on a window bench.
On the fi rst day NHK reported a very low number of dead people—those whose bodies had already 
been found and registered—if I remember correctly, it started with some 50 or 60. The number rose 
slowly during the next hours—then quickly to some 1,500. Then suddenly the next day NHK mentioned 
that in a northern Japanese city some 10,000 people were missing. Victims, in the sense of displaced 
population, were only presented the next day (as far as I can remember). NHK  did not show dead or 
seriously injured victims.
While visiting Chinese academic institutions during the next days, I was mainly following the 
earthquake via German and international media, specifi cally Spiegel Online and New York Times, while 
my wife observed NHK and a Japanese newsportal. From the beginning coverage of the problems in 
the nuclear power station differed greatly. From the fi rst day, I remember that Spiegel Online was 
sensitive to potential dangers of a nuclear power station running out of control. They reported about 
the fi rst explosion, however, some days later Spiegel gave the impression that things were or could 
come under control. On the fi rst day NHK reported about the explosion in the power station—but 
rather in a marginal note. The dangers seemed to be rather minimized—as far as I could understand 
from the translations and interpretations of my wife. Later on, also the detection of nuclear fallout 
and radiation was rather commented to be in a somehow normal range. My wife and me had the 
impression during the fi rst fi ve days that the problems in the power station could be controlled and 
the fallout was mainly going to the sea.
Our perception was rather challenged by some mails which I got from friends in Germany (and 
other parts of the world). Two of my close German friends argued strongly that we should make 
our family leave Japan—or at least the Tokyo region. When I answered that things did not look so 
dangerous from our perspective, they said that according to their information already the core of 
two of the four reactors was melting. They argued it were already a disaster worse than Chernobyl. We 
got scared, also since we were moving geographically closer to the danger zone (coastal eastern 
China). The validity of the different assessments was hard to judge—also due to our limited access to 
news sources. My wife did not communicate these advices and judgments to her family. She did not 
consider herself to be in a position to give advice from outside the country not knowing the real condi-
tions (though we felt that the Japanese media probably misrepresented the potential dangers).
Heroes or victims? Preconceptions and news reports about disasters
Dieter Neubert
Professor of Development Sociology, 
University of Bayreuth
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What may an ordinary German citizen learn about the Sendai earthquake from the TV and news-
papers? What do the communicated images of Japan and the Japanese represent; the reality of a 
disaster or our preconceptions about the people affected?
The reports of the fi rst week were dominated by the typical disaster images. Videos showing 
shaking walls, the enormous tsunami moving cars, ships and houses like toys. Reports on displaced 
people surviving in shelters. We learned that food, heating, even water were scarce. Hospitals were 
without electricity and faced a shortage of drugs. We saw people walking through a debris fi eld trying 
to fi nd the place where their house once was situated. The German media soon shifted their focus to 
the destroyed Fukushima nuclear power plant. Water cannons and helicopters helplessly tried to cool 
down the melting kernel of the reactor blocks and people were evacuated from the area around the 
reactor. Since then every news program has been presenting an expert for nuclear energy and biology 
explaining how a nuclear reactors works, what went already wrong and what we have to expect from 
the destructed power plant. The nuclear threat left only limited space for reports on emergency aid 
activities and attempts to reconstruct the destroyed infrastructure. However, the implicit message 
communicated by the media coverage was, that this extreme disaster was so large that even a highly 
industrialised country like Japan is challenged beyond its limits.
Again and again we heard about the disciplined manner of the Japanese people in the affected 
areas and in the metropolitan area of Tokyo who were dealing with their hardship and the threat of a 
nuclear contamination. The Japanese people are praised because of their solidarity and we hear about 
the “Heroes of Japan” (a heading fl ashed in a news programme broadcasted by NTV at 18.3.2011) who 
help the displaced and risk their lives to fi ght against the complete explosion of the reactors. It is 
indeed impressing how the people handle hardship and threats.
However, we might shortly remember the images of other disasters in the media. For example, 
during the Haiti earthquake in 2010 the reports presented a government completely out of control of 
the situation and people who passively bear another burden in the long line of political oppression 
and extreme poverty. The message was that the affected people were victims and completely in the 
hands of the international community, unable to survive on their own. Their inactivity was seen as a 
demonstration of passivity not as discipline.
Ulrich Beck reminded us recently (Süddeutsche Zeitung 14.3.2011) that the Chernobyl disaster 
in 1986 was presented as a “communist disaster” resulting from communist disorganization and jog 
trot. The helpless actions to contain the meltdown were another proof for the technological backward-
ness of the Soviet industry. And the people scarifi cing their lives in the fi ght against the nuclear disas-
ter were shown as victims of an inhuman regime that tried to compensate their technology failures 
and technological hubris in ordering fi refi ghters, nuclear experts and laborers on a deadly mission.
According to the reports Haitians were passive, depressed, not able to help themselves. Communists 
were not able to master the nuclear high-tech and had no respect for human life; but the advanced 
Japanese were simply overwhelmed by a disaster exceeding any imagination and still managed to be 
disciplined, full of solidarity and brave up to self-sacrifi ce.
The Japanese philosopher Kenichi Mishima contested this image of Japan and the Japanese. 
For him this image is just a projection from a central European perspective (Kenichi Mishima Ver-
führen Sie mich bitte nicht zum Nationalismus! Frankfurter Rundschau 20.3.2011). Some recent inter-
views with Chernobyl “liquidators” (the ones who fought the nuclear disaster) showed that those staff 
members who survived see their fi ght to contain the reactor as an expression of their professional 
attitude. By no means did they see themselves abused by a violent political regime.
The images presented by the media reports follow a kind of hidden agenda that represents our 
preconception about people and nations. I have the greatest respect for the staff risking their lives in 
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the nuclear power plant in Fukushima and for the people in the shelters seeking to keep a minimum 
of self-esteem and composure in Japan.
However, the people in Haiti, Chernobyl and those affected by other disasters earn the same 
respect, too. We may learn from the media reports as much on our own view at the world as on the 
events which are reported.
Japan: A tale of two national disasters
On 28 October 1891 the Great No¯bi Earthquake struck Japan. In terms of its human cost, with a death 
toll of between 7–8,000 people it was by no means the largest earthquake disaster in the nation’s 
history. In 1923, for example, the Great Kanto¯ Earthquake killed more than 100,000 people. However, 
according to historian Gregory Clancey, it was Japan’s fi rst truly national ‘natural’ disaster. At an 
estimated 8.0 in magnitude the Great No¯bi Earthquake not only caused considerable loss of life and 
massive destruction to infrastructure (from Tokyo to Osaka), it also rocked the Meiji government to 
its very foundations.
Before the 1891 earthquake struck, the 23-year-old Meiji government had been self-consciously 
Western in its outlook. Its modernisation project had seen the hiring of foreign architects and engi-
neers—particularly from Britain—to transform Japan’s ‘fragile’ wooden built environment into some-
thing more solid using bricks and mortar. But during the Great No¯bi Earthquake nearly all Western-
style brick buildings collapsed, while new communications infrastructure such as railroad bridges 
and telegraph systems were also destroyed. Transferred without much thought being given to local 
conditions, European design and materials were shown to be fragile and unsuited to the seismic 
Japanese environment. In contrast, the survival of seventeenth-century Nagoya Castle and other 
monumental Tokugawa-period buildings revealed the effi cacy of traditional Japanese design 
in resisting seismicity (although the poorly constructed wooden homes of many ordinary people 
collapsed). After the catastrophe there was a revival of interest in—and a new appreciation for—tradi-
tional Japanese architecture, and Japanese knowledge more generally, as well as some harsh criticism 
of over-Westernisation.
Press attention largely focused on the destruction of ‘foreign’ brick and iron structures (rather 
than Japanese buildings), such as the Nagara River Railroad Bridge, Nagoya Post Offi ce and modern 
spinning mills in Nagoya and Osaka. The fragility of new Western-style design, and the resilience 
of pre-modern Japanese structures, was also depicted in popular woodblock prints (with falling 
industrial chimneys a prominent theme). As Clancey notes in his book Earthquake Nation (2006), 
anti-Western sentiment in the press, allied to the highly visible collapse of the modernisation project, 
weakened the Meiji government. The Japan Weekly Mail, for example, criticised it for failing to prop-
erly regulate the building industry. The government was forced to re-evaluate a project that was 
Stephen Mosley
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clearly unsuited to an earthquake zone. As foreign knowledge had been found wanting, post-disaster 
there developed a hybrid building style better adapted to Japanese conditions—and less dependent 
on the ideas of foreign ‘experts’—that synthesised the best of past and present design techniques. 
In addition, Japanese scientists were to become world leaders in seismology by the early twentieth 
century, and their reports often stressed the superior ability of Japanese-designed buildings to with-
stand seismic shocks.
Japan’s Prime Minister Naoto Kan called the earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011, and 
their aftermath, an “unprecedented national disaster”. While offi cial responses to ‘natural’ catastrophes 
often characterise them as ‘one-off’ occurrences, so as not to damage confi dence in a society’s potential 
to successfully recover, the ‘triple disaster’—earthquake, tsunami and a nuclear crisis—that struck 
Japan was exceptional. The nation’s long experience in dealing with seismic shocks, its engineering 
know-how and its now rigorous building codes provided a measure of protection. Japan’s great build-
ings did not fall, undoubtedly saving many thousands of lives in urban areas. However, the 40-year-
old Fukushima nuclear plant was constructed before recent research showed that the ‘Jo¯gan’ earth-
quake and tsunami of 869 had caused serious fl ooding (reaching up to 4 kilometres inland). And even 
the depth of experience acquired by Japan as an ‘earthquake nation’ was insuffi cient to prepare 
adequately for the cascading effects of multiple disasters.
While it is perhaps too soon to talk of learning lessons from a national disaster that is still 
unfolding, media attention on the struggle to contain radiation from the badly-damaged Fukushima 
reactors has already prompted a global rethink on nuclear power. Following powerful explosions at 
the plant, governments around the world have been forced to refl ect on the safety of nuclear plants 
on their soil (even where seismic activity is low). Comprehensive reviews of nuclear facilities are 
already underway in the USA, Russia, China, Britain and elsewhere, while the German government 
has taken all reactors operational before 1980 offl ine as it reconsiders its nuclear strategy. General 
Electric, the American corporation that designed and built several reactors at the Fukushima plant, 
has drawn criticism in the press over possible design weaknesses. Although the industry as a whole 
has recently enjoyed some success in cultivating a safer, greener image—as a source of low-carbon 
energy production to reduce global warming—the events at Fukushima are likely to damage public 
confi dence in nuclear power for decades to come.
Representations of disaster and development 
in the Sendai emergency
From a development perspective, the Sendai Earthquake and Tsunami raised expectations regards 
humankind’s capacity to deal with larger scale environmental events that occur in contexts of ‘higher 
development’. Some aspirations of development were on the face of it partly confi rmed, for whilst 
THE EARTHQUAKE, THE TSUNAMI AND THE NUCLEAR MELTDOWN IN JAPAN
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the earthquake was one of the strongest recorded, intense ground-shaking resulted in less damage 
than recent seismic events in Pakistan, China, Haiti, Chile or New Zealand. Earthquake and Tsunami 
are presumed, and to a large extent are, within the normal consciousness of people in Japan from an 
early age. It is a country that has preparedness through specially adapted built environments, com-
munity disaster education and civil response systems considered amongst the best. Further, whilst 
the longer-term impacts from this multi-hazard event remain only partially possible to quantify or 
qualify, multiple aspects of resilience have already been evident. Personal reports received from Japa-
nese colleagues working with disaster management at this time are both moving and professional. 
Some engaged in disaster academia also run local NGO operations for recovery and rehabilitation 
in their communities, and consequently have found themselves personally involved in relief and 
recovery actions. Others, like us viewing it from further afi eld, assess and refl ect on the forthcoming 
challenges exposed across the sector. Brief glimpses into the lives of survivors facilitated by TV crews 
reveal all types of people in Japan engaged with this tragedy, whether emotionally, motivationally 
or both. Offi cial statements draw on national resolve and the capacity to adapt and recover. The 
adage ‘built back better’, though not yet so apparent in the rhetoric, will inevitably become a mantra 
once the worst of the impact has become more fully systematised. Disorder and raw exposure to the 
immediate realities of the event are likely to turn to data and to procedure banded around the media, 
though giving birth also to new meanings and hopes for sustainable development.
Beyond seeing the effects of development on disaster risk, and of disaster on development in 
Japan at this time lie some clear realities that are likely to infl uence critical interpretation of what 
really happened. These constitute underlying truisms beyond the variable representations that can 
be derived from disaster communication, the basics from which we might begin to reassess develop-
ment from this crisis. They include three underlying features that divert analyses from ‘high develop-
ment’ expectations of disaster mitigation, to challenges for personal, national and international con-
fi dence in development itself. Firstly, the magnitude of the hazard crossed thresholds beyond which 
Japan’s development proved insuffi cient, secondly combined hazards produced threats greater than 
the sum of their individual parts, and thirdly the very symbols of development itself (i.e. nuclear 
power plants) proved vulnerable to perpetuating already high human costs still further. Tsunami 
defence developments were not high enough to hold back the magnitude of the wave produced, 
and the combined risks of earthquake, tsunami and nuclear impact remained hitherto unknown. 
Uncertainty prevailed throughout much of the period during, and in the immediate aftermath of 
these events, with further gaps in understanding and speculation regards possible knock on effects 
to the economy, stability and nature of a recovery process. These confront the profession whose very 
mission of disaster risk reduction (drr) includes improving capacity to anticipate and innovate, but 
which remains far from developed. It is not known when or where the next aftershock will occur. 
Despite advances in the fi elds that address these threats, speculations via the media are to be expected 
for months and years to come, being underlain not only by the vagaries of communication and repre-
sentation, but by the gaps in science, policy and practice.
Communicating the outcomes of this disaster will therefore be not so much about how Japan’s 
development status managed to offset an even greater disaster, but how its people will now resolve to 
get further development out of catastrophic experience. To what extent will building back better be 
about reviewing the mix of benefi ts and risks in Japan’s entire development trajectory, emphasising 
‘build back signifi cantly different’? Will this be through aid and external assistance, or as with India 
during the wake of the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004, will Japan resist international involvement 
beyond those temporary search and rescue teams? Should its recovery process draw on less from 
outside and how will the on-looking media reporters represent for better or worse the process of 
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endogenous recovery? How will communication with other parts of the world be in the interests 
of common rights of humanity to know, to understand and to learn from each other, and is there 
cultural context beyond people’s immediate needs that will remain beyond external representa-
tions? To consider this we would need to allow time for those who would grieve, refl ect and evaluate, 
and to consider how best to communicate about disaster and development.
Approaching the end of disaster preparedness
Within the international environmental hazard and risk community Japan is regarded as exemplary, 
sometimes even as role model. It is infamous for its constant threat of earthquakes and tsunamis, 
and it has a good reputation for its comprehensive preparedness for so-called ‘natural’ disasters. Ten 
thousand confi rmed casualties plus more than 17,500 missing is an enormous, inconceivable death 
toll of the To¯hoku earthquake of March 11, 2011, but an earthquake with the same magnitude in 
Germany (where nobody expects such strong ground motion) would result in—probably—millions 
of casualties. By its magnitude, the To¯hoku earthquake was among the top fi ve earthquakes ever 
recorded in modern times.
Although information about death and destruction in Japan is provisional it is likely that most 
victims died because of the tidal wave and not as direct effects of the earthquake. The tsunami hit 
Honshu’s eastern coast only minutes after the earthquake, with a very short time for warning and 
escape. When a tidal wave of this size hits the coast, structural protection like sea walls is almost use-
less. Those caught by the wave had hardly any chance to survive. It is not known whether the areas 
destroyed by the tsunami had designated evacuation routes; however, there were only minutes for 
warning and evacuation in any case.
It is clear that disaster preparedness is a task never fully accomplished, but with regard to the 
immediate coping with the earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011 there is consensus that Japan 
and its population performed very well.
However, all these ‘natural disaster’ issues were very soon eclipsed by the news coverage of 
effects on Japan’s nuclear industry. Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant has for some ten days now been 
top of Germany’s news agenda: even when there was no new information it was at the center of the 
fi rst report in every newscast. And, due to the information strategy of the national government and 
the owner of the Nuclear Power Plant, there is not much reliable information available. Many of the 
victims who had survived earthquake and tsunami were further victimized by radiation emitted 
from the power plant out of control.
While immediately after the Great Hanshin earthquake in 1995 up to one million Japanese from 
all over the country volunteered in the disaster prone area in and around Kobe, this time the victims 
received much less help and assistance. Apparently, parts of the disaster zone inside the evacua-
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tion radius of 20 kilometers around Fukushima Daiichi power plant did not see much emergency 
assistance at all. Future debates will probably explore whether international media interest and/or 
national Japanese emergency management neglected those people and places hit by the tsunami in 
favor of the nuclear incident.
Two weeks later, the owner of the nuclear power plant is still unable to control the radiation 
leaks. After the complete break-down of the plant’s emergency electricity system, the strategy to 
regain control over the six reactors plus thousands of tons of nuclear fuel accumulated in 35 years is 
necessarily improvised, trial and error muddling-through. Basically, it is the wind that determines 
which areas and which parts of the population become polluted by radiation, be it the Tokyo metro-
politan area with its 30 million plus inhabitants or the ocean. Tap water in Tokyo is already polluted. 
It is only a matter of time for the shortages of food, water and fuel to spread, although so far it 
affects primarily the 250,000 homeless living in emergency shelters. In time to come the radioactive 
contamination of the environment could be extensive, especially problematic is the pollution with 
plutonium used in reactor number three, because 239plutonium is not just infamous for its harmful, 
peculiar physical and chemical properties in nuclear weapons, but also for its radioactive half-life of 
more than 24,000 years.
While one can only estimate the spatial and temporal patterns of worldwide nuclear contamina-
tion to come, it is clear that the despair and hardship of the affected will be tremendous. Unfortunately, 
disaster preparedness so helpful in dealing with earthquakes and tsunamis turns out to be absolutely 
inadequate in face of the ongoing radioactive pollution.
The destruction of Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant: 
A decision making catastrophe?
Among the many images that will be remembered from the Sendai earthquake and its catastrophic 
main and side effects there is a very peculiar one: A humble person dressed in a blue working suit, 
bowing in front of the Japanese fl ag, stepping up to a speaker’s desk and reporting about the situation 
in Fukushima, possible developments, and steps already taken and planned for.
For the western correspondents these press conferences were very confusing. The language used 
by this spokesperson (Cabinet-Secretary Yuka Edano) was described as vague and imprecise, in many 
instances the information provided was seen as inconsistent and contradictory, concealing as much 
as confi rming. For some commentators this was a clear symptom of faulty decision making processes 
in the Japanese emergency management organizations that apparently were unable to come up with 
a clear assessment of the situation and fi rm and appropriate counter measures.
However, this assessment reveals more about western conceptions of ‘how emergency manage-
ment ought to be done properly’ than it is a valid description of shortcomings on the Japanese side: 
Stefan Strohschneider
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In almost all western societies emergency management procedures are organized following a model 
that was developed by the Prussian military during the course of the 19th century. This model requires 
a central crisis management group, divided into specifi c functions, which collects and integrates all 
available information, decides about priorities, allocates resources and takes all other necessary deci-
sions and then communicates these to the forces up front who execute the orders. The centre of this 
system is the role of the operational staff leader who has a full overview at all times and carries the 
fi nal responsibility for all decisions.
In civil emergencies, there will be a specifi cally trained media person that has direct access to 
these assessments and decisions and therefore can disseminate them immediately.
This model is an expression of the implicit assumption that complexity, intransparency, and 
dynamics can be managed best by a centralized, hierarchical structure that utilizes and coordinates 
individual decision making capabilities. There is, however, growing evidence that such a structure 
may not fi t Japanese practices. Rather, Japanese decision making (at least in non-emergency operations) 
can be described as an extended social process of joint constraint satisfaction where decisions are not 
‘taken’* but evolve during lengthy discussions of the pros and cons of the available alternatives.
This process is time consuming and often described as not very creative; it guarantees, on the 
other hand, the commitment of all relevant stake holders. This style also avoids a situation where any 
person can be singled out as having more infl uence than the others which would be considered a 
violation of the principle of balance and, more importantly, impolite.
As of now, we do not know whether the decision making processes in the operation centres 
dealing with the Fukushima disaster do in fact follow this pattern and whether this pattern is, in 
turn, responsible for the poor information policy and the apparently slow reaction. We also do not 
know whether western emergency managers (who offered assistance early but were rejected) with 
their more decisive approach would have made any difference. The interesting question is whether 
there can be universal emergency management models at all or, to put it differently, to what extent 
successful emergency management needs to be embedded in the local cultures of decision making.
On the problem of ‘localizing’ (nuclear) disasters
Communicating a disaster involves a wide range of symbolic practices, from rather ‘global’ political 
and scientifi c discourses to various forms of interaction in (more or less disturbed) everyday situa-
tions. Therefore, as a disaster unfolds, the general knowledge about its characteristics has to be 
related to manifold social settings and their specifi c spatial, temporal and practical conditions (like 
the ‘topography’ for evacuation or the delivery of relief items, the ‘locales’ for organizations dealing 
with technical and natural crises or the signposting of dangerous ‘areas’). The communicative task 
then is not only to make these settings understandable by talking about them from an outsider’s 
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perspective but also to act communicatively and practically within them, e.g. by guiding peoples’ 
perceptions and nonverbal actions in situ by suitable localized means of media and communication 
(e.g. public signage, locative digital media).
In case of a nuclear crisis these manifold attempts of ‘localizing’ the disaster communicatively 
have to cope with at least three challenges of determining the disaster’s extensions: Firstly, 
since radioactive rays cannot be perceived directly by human senses, the collection, visualization, 
verbalization, dissemination and processing of data and knowledge about radiation is based on (net-
worked) sensor technologies that enhance everyday means of perception, cognition and communica-
tion. As sensors have become ever more sensitive, even small traces of radioactivity spreading out 
from a ‘local’ trouble source can be detected all over the world within a short period of time. Further-
more, people and their clothing as well as goods and products traveling from irradiated areas into 
other parts of the world can become subject to widespread measures of control. Communicating a 
nuclear disaster therefore is largely about defi ning its extension in and through practices of making 
radiation measurable and assessable (e.g. by negotiating and defi ning certain boundary values). As sen-
sors successively become part of everyday (public) life, a set of practical and political questions arise: 
Who is supposed to have access to sensor technologies by means of design and education and thus 
who will be enabled and empowered to participate in these discourses (Kuznetsov & Paulos 2010)? 
How are communities, organizations and societies collectively shaping the communicative process 
of debating and defi ning boundary values? What are the specifi c conditions and limitations of dif-
ferent modes and codes (related to cultural contexts) for representing radioactivity visually and 
acoustically (e.g. by the pace of clicking noises, binary color codes, iconic representations, human 
languages etc.), and how is ‘the message’ transformed when one medium is used to make a meaning 
based on another medium ‘readable’ in a different way (cf. L. Jäger’s concept of ‘transcriptivity’)?
Secondly, the spatial dimension of a nuclear disaster does not only transform the (semiotic) 
landscape where it took place and a certain radius of the local environment. Rather, in relation to 
wind direction and rainfall it is likely that other, distant regions will be affected as well, although it 
is hard to predict which areas and within what radius will be affected or to what extent. Since this 
discontinuous and dynamic landscape of nuclear disaster is very hard to survey, the open threat of a 
nuclear contamination and hypothetical or practical precautions (staying inside the house, moving 
to another region, evacuating people etc.) are likely to trigger communication that is directed at 
dynamically relating the ongoing process of the disaster to manifold ‘local’ perspectives (both in the 
spatial as well as in the social sense).
Finally, the temporal dimension gives rise to the question of which perspective becomes accepted 
(for a period of time) in the public process of political decision making which is also dependent on local 
resources (e.g. scientists known by the media who are familiar with supporting or questioning 
nuclear power in national public discourse). On the long run the question becomes relevant of “how 
present day humans can convey the locations and specifi c dangers of nuclear waste to their descen-
dants” (R. Posner) over thousands and tens of thousands of years—obviously without being able to 
know future sensor technology or conventions of reading natural indications or cultural remains, 
sources and traditions. Turning to the past, one might learn from the deep history of mankind’s 
experiences with traditional technologies about continuity and transformation in representing and 
imparting risk-related knowledge and thus be able to specify the abstract semiotic conditions for com-
municating disaster in the diachronic dimension. But we will have to be aware of the fact that—even 
if the warning will be understood—a disaster by defi nition always exceeds the ‘futures’ our institu-
tions are prepared to cope with.
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The Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster
I am a system-safety specialist, discussing disaster with sociologists. One happened—an enormous 
natural event which triggered a disaster. Let me look at part of it, namely the system-safety disaster 
at the Fukushima Dai-ichi (Number 1) nuclear power station.
A nuclear power plant is what I call a teleological engineered system. Like a car, or an airplane, it 
has a purpose, and it is designed by one (or a few) legal actor(s) to fulfi l that purpose. As a system, it 
distinguishes itself from, say, a town, which is a collection of houses, shops, workshops and offi ces, 
mostly designed and constructed piecewise, for divergent purposes, indeed purposes which are often 
contrary, by many actors. Fukushima Dai-ichi has people swarming all over it, designing, specifying, 
building, operating, maintaining, and fi lling out all the paperwork which somehow gives us a comfy 
feeling of organisation aiming to fulfi l the purpose. But no longer. Here it is, not producing two watts 
of what it is supposed to produce, but instead injuring people, threatening to distribute large 
amounts of its highly toxic component substances above ground, below ground, and in the water. 
What went wrong?
The technology behind fi ssive nuclear power is exothermic. The plant requires active cooling at 
all times, even when not operating. If it is not cooled then an accident is inevitable. Cooling requires 
power. When the plant is working, maybe from itself. When it is shut down, then from somewhere 
else. It follows that power supply must be unfailingly reliable in order to avoid an accident.
Primary power comes from outside. The existence of a secondary power system tells us that some-
one foresaw circumstances in which primary power would be interrupted. (They were right! An earth-
quake cut primary power; the live reactors, Units 1–3 of 6, shut down as planned.) Can secondary 
power be interrupted? If so, we need tertiary power ... and so on. The tertiary power is trivial—batteries 
with a life of 8 hours. It follows no one thought secondary power could be interrupted for longer than 
that. But it was! It was taken out.
Everything else about this disaster follows from that one event: Secondary power was taken out. 
How? It was in a ‘basement’, which was fl ooded by the tsunami. Let us focus on the tsunami for a 
moment. At time of construction, it seems no one evaluated the tsunami hazard (Marlene Weiss, 
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Süddeutsche Zeitung 19–10.03.2011). Later they did, but “no one thought of a tsunami that high!”. Not 
so—a tsunami expert brought it up at a meeting at the regulator, NISA, in 2009. He recounts that his 
concern was—in my words, not his—peremptorily dismissed (David Nakamura and Chico Harlan, 
Washington Post, 23.03.2011). Tsunami experts have expressed their astonishment at the lack of 
apparent tsunami awareness at the regulator or plant operator (Norimitsu Onishi and James 
Glanz, New York Times, 26.03.2011). It is important to keep in mind that this is just one way the 
secondary power can be taken out, but not the only way.
Engineers designing, building and operating safety-critical systems are required by standards to 
perform a hazard analysis (HazAn). A hazard is, roughly speaking, a precursor of an accident, so you 
have to know fi rst what the accidents are—what the events are which constitute accidents. It is pretty 
clear to everyone in the nuclear industry that meltdown is an accident and it is equally clear that lack 
of cooling leads directly to meltdown. (It’s not the only one: you have to keep the spent fuel pools 
cooled, else they evaporate and burn. It’s clear that that constitutes an accident event also.) So losing 
all cooling for a long enough period of time is an event that leads inevitably to an accident. Your 
secondary power just cannot be taken out for longish periods of time when your primary power is 
not available. There, that’s (part of) a HazAn, with the derived safety requirement. HazAn is no more, 
and certainly no less, than this kind of reasoning, but you must systematically cover everything.
The next formal step is to ask about mitigation. What can happen to secondary power to take it 
out? It can fail because it is poorly maintained (mitigation: maintain it properly. This is a known 
quantity.) It can fail because on-demand systems often fail on demand (mitigation: run it continuous-
ly, at low power, so you know it runs when it is asked to cut in). It can fail because a large airplane 
crashes into it (mitigation: design the building accordingly. This was a consideration for English gas-
cooled nuclear plants in the early 1970’s). It can fail because of a bomb (mitigation: good security at 
the gates and perimeters). It can fail because it’s fl ooded. Before someone says “thousand-year tsu-
nami”, recall that there are two and a half million gallons of water perched in the air in the spent-fuel 
pools of the six reactors, which pools just might be breached during an earthquake—but weren’t, as it 
turns out. You should think of that, even if a tsunami doesn’t occur to you. (Mitigation: design the 
secondary power to function while submerged. They do it in submarines, this is a known quantity.)
Maybe such HazAns weren’t state of the practice when the plant was built decades ago? HazAns 
are also required by standards during operations, which were continuing up to March, 2011.
“But no one can think of everything!” That is, though, the purpose of a HazAn. You may make a 
mistake, of course, in your HazAn. But the reasoning above is routine, one thing following from 
another; I would require from my students no less.
Now to the point of this shaggy dog story. How did the builders, owners and operators of this 
plant miss all this for forty years? To answer that question, you don’ need an engineer, you need a 
sociologist! There, I said it!
Do you need to answer it? Most certainly you do. It helps you to fi nd other plants, other power 
companies, where similar things could have happened and could be happening, so we can step in 
before something equally extreme happens.
You also need somebody to tell you what the consequences of such an extreme event are. Engi-
neers work on experience. Commercial jet transport airplanes are thought of, justifi ably, as maybe 
the most highly reliable complex artifacts ever built. Wings used to fall off (say, from Wellingtons, 
seventy years ago). They don’t any more (or only as a consequence of some other unrecoverable event). 
Experience makes the difference: we have fi ve to twenty fatal accidents with commercial jet airliners 
per year to learn from. Compare with nuclear power: we have had three, maybe four, extreme events 
in fi fty years (Windscale, maybe Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Fukushima 1). Who can tell us what the 
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consequences are? Two engineering colleagues said: Chernobyl, 60+ fatal. Some medical researchers 
say: 6,000+ fatal. Greenpeace says: 200,000+ fatal. If the weather had been different, maybe tens of 
thousands more in Kiev. When the serious estimates of fatalities (alone! then there is the damage to 
the environment to consider) differ by four orders of magnitude, as here, then the answer seems to be 
that no one can tell us reliably. Or even what the possible consequences are. The engineering risk 
calculus of probability times severity doesn’t work, either. It gives one answer before Chernobyl, 
another answer after Chernobyl, and yet another answer after Fukushima. A decision aid is useless if 
it gives you different answers each time you have an unwanted event. An engineer can’t tell you.
Can a sociologist tell us? Maybe not. Then who?
Judging from the color of smoke: What Fukushima tells 
us about information infrastructure breakdowns and IT 
development methodologies
Is there a nuclear meltdown in the Fukushima nuclear power plant? It took until day 17 after the East 
Japan earthquake and tsunami crisis until this question was answered for at least one of the reactors 
(No. 2) in Fukushima. The earthquake and its tsunami did not only shatter houses and thousands of 
lives, but also the trust and confi dence in technology and the offi cial communication policies of one 
of the most advanced nations in the world.
It has been a defi nitional part of the technological conception of a nuclear power plant to install 
an information infrastructure that would keep the engineers informed about the processes that go 
on inside the plant, and to provide them with means to manage all processes. On day 17, the question 
described above is still so diffi cult to answer because the sensors, wires and screens that have been 
built into the plant have been damaged or left without power together with the installations they 
were to monitor. And suddenly experts trained in electrical engineering and nuclear engineering 
are judging from the color of smoke (white vs. grey, steam vs. soot) over Block 3 which of its parts are 
burning or may have undergone problematic structural changes.
Information availability and/or information policies of TEPCO and the Japanese government do 
not allow us to exactly diagnose the nature of the information infrastructure breakdown that may 
be going on in the Fukushima facility. But it makes us notice, how dependent on information infra-
structures we have become, and how vulnerable we are when IT and monitoring systems break down. 
From a perspective of the disciplines of Computer Science and Information Systems, Fukushima pro-
vides reasons to reconsider the way reliable information systems are developed.
There is no doubt that existing Software Engineering development methods reliably cover the 
development of the core functionality to make information available where it is needed. But when a 
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technological system becomes an infrastructure, more is needed. Infrastructures become invisible 
during use, but upon breakdown they come to the fore, and it becomes a most urgent task to engage 
in coping and recovery activities. One strategy to deal with these necessities is to take as many steps 
as possible to prevent any failure—that is what usually guides the development of technical systems. 
This is a honorable strategy, but it is dangerous to ignore the risk that the unthinkable could become 
true.
We should therefore reframe the problem and investigate new strategies that refl ect the specifi c 
human competencies to manage uncertain situations and deal with exceptional breakdown situa-
tions. We should consider specifi c characteristics of IT systems: Computational refl ection and IT as a 
medium. Decentralized IT systems connected to the Internet particularly possess means for compu-
tational refl ection to observe their own behavior and their connections with other artifacts and 
infrastructures, and then adapt the behavior to deal with failures of parts of the system. And IT sys-
tems are also a medium that may provide status reports about the inner workings and to adapt the 
system interactively to a new situation. Together with the ability to integrate new components in an 
ad-hoc manner, this makes IT infrastructures highly fl exible. But this fl exibility remains useless, if it 
is not integrated into the improvisation practices of its users.
So, reframing the problem also implies that we should understand more profoundly activities 
and embodied practice of developing reliable infrastructures as an on-going accomplishment. The 
sociologist Susan Leigh Star and the historian Geoffrey Bowker investigated in their essay ‘How 
to infrastructure’* the characteristics that constitute an infrastructure, and go beyond a description 
of the technological entities. They also address the social and organizational arrangements that 
make a technological system an infrastructure (e.g. shaping and being shaped by conventions, being 
learned as part of membership to a fi eld of practice). IT systems—now understood as a computation-
ally refl ective medium—can do more than other technologies by also supporting activities that allow 
the articulation, negotiation and change of these social arrangements, e.g. by offering communica-
tion channels or by allowing the observation of usages.
Looking at Fukushima and the crucial role information infrastructures play for organizing the 
coping and recovery work, we see that, on a technological level, we need fault tolerant, decentralized 
IT systems that consist of autonomous, ad-hoc replaceable components that have independent power 
supplies. Such systems must be dynamically re-confi gurable to support for improvisational activities 
in coping and recovery work. This implies that the system should be able to deliver information about 
the state of connected sensors and describe the structural state of the plant.
Based on this consideration, we have to investigate into IT systems that make their behavior 
accountable and provide a support for improvisation, and for unanticipated usage patterns; into IT 
systems that make use of the refl exive and the media capabilities inherent to the technology; and into 
IT systems that provide communication means among the relevant stakeholders in order to support 
improvisational activities of coping and recovery work in a decentralized manner. This investigation 
has to be complemented by IT development methodologies that do not just focus on a technical 
system, but include awareness for the social and technological infrastructures they are based upon, 
and the social and technological infrastructures they are going to support. In the case of a break-
down, less sophisticated technologies should establish links to older infrastructures (e.g. by provid-
ing simple video cameras, or by providing printouts about the current state of the plant that could 
help setting up a low-tech communication system) must be seamlessly includable to increase the 
resiliency of the information infrastructure as a whole. We also have to consider the role of IT as a 
second order infrastructure which collects information with regard to improvisational recovery 
work and where this work was successful, even under extreme conditions as seen in Fukushima.
* 
Star, Susan L. & Geoffrey 
Bowker: How to infrastructure. 
In: Lievrouw, Leah A. & Sonia 
Livingstine (eds.): Handbook of 
New Media—Social Shaping and Con-
sequences of ICTs, London: SAGE 
Pub., 2002, 151–162.
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So, if at some point judging from the color of smoke becomes an important improvisational activity, 
information infrastructures can and should be able to support this, too.
Coordination, information, collaboration
At the time of writing over 35 national humanitarian organisations are assisting offi cial emergency 
agencies and local volunteers in Japan (SEEDS 2011). Many international Search and Rescue teams 
support them, as well as transnational organisations gathering, visualising and sharing information 
(Crisis Commons, Ushahidi, Google, esri, the Harvard Center for Geographic Analysis), including 
information from public crowdsourcing efforts where individuals plot, for example, local radiation 
levels (http://www.rdtn.org/).
The scale of destruction, subsequent transport, energy and communications outages, as well as 
differences in national, organisational and professional cultures and languages make it unsurprising 
that communication was diffi cult. But—not for the fi rst time (see e.g. Tierney and Goltz 1997)—pro-
fessional refl ections on response efforts highlight coordination, information, and collaboration as in 
need of improvement. Like their counterparts in the US after Katrina, local analysts call for a ‘total 
coordination centre’ at prefecture level, connected to regional and local coordination points, as well 
as better efforts to ‘share the right information at the right time’ (especially with the public), and 
better collaboration between professional and non-governmental organisations and volunteers 
(Shaw 2011).
But these demands are not ‘natural’ responses to ‘obvious’ and avoidable failings. They are in no 
small part made possible by everyday experiences and imaginaries of technologically mediated mobile 
living. In a world where economic, personal and professional relationships are routinely ‘stretched’ 
across the globe, socio-technical change has reached deep into the fabric of Japanese society. Observers 
document new practices of micro-coordinating everyday lives (Ling and Yttri 2002), as well as trans-
formations of intimacy and individuality (Matsuda 2009), and location privacy (Licoppe and Inada 
2009). Disaster response, too, is a refl exive nexus for socio-technical innovation—responding to calls 
for improvements, contributing to transformations of everyday practice and raising expectations. 
There are many resonances with European innovation efforts and I briefl y summarise two projects.
In direct response to the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake, Hatayama, Kakumoto, and Kameda 
(2010) developed a ‘Risk-Adaptive Regional Management Information System’ (RARMIS). As part of a 
participatory design process, early prototypes of this Geographical Information (GIS) System were 
deployed after the Kobe earthquake to assist in the administration of fi nancial support for the dis-
mantling of damaged buildings. It mapped owners with properties, records of identifi cation and 
support granted. The system allowed government clerks to replace paper forms and archives with 
THE EARTHQUAKE, THE TSUNAMI AND THE NUCLEAR MELTDOWN IN JAPAN
Monika Büscher
Director of the mobilities.lab, 
Lancaster University
23    
Z
iF
-M
it
te
il
u
n
ge
n
  2
|2
01
1
THE EARTHQUAKE, THE TSUNAMI AND THE NUCLEAR MELTDOWN IN JAPAN
digital ones and signifi cantly speeded up the process of recovery. A number of lessons from this early 
implementation have informed subsequent design iterations. The system:
•  should be used also under normal circumstances (to facilitate up-to-date data availability and 
skills of use)
• should not require expert skills, as novices may need to use it 
• must be portable
• should not depend on computer networks (because these can be disrupted)
• should facilitate information integration
Further, effi ciency gains should be aimed at service improvement (not a reduction of workforce). 
The system has since been used in other contexts, e.g. during preventative action during the 2007 
Kiyotake Avian Infl uenza (HPAI) epidemic.
More far-reaching innovations in ‘next generation information and communication technology 
services underlying the resilient society’ are envisaged and built by NTT, Asia’s largest telecommuni-
cations company (Maeda et al. 2010). They bring together location devices, life-logs and bio-sensors, 
internet, database, search and datamining technologies to map, track and interrogate citizens’ move-
ments and personal data. In normal times, such data is expected to be used to provide healthcare, 
public services, and e-government. At times of crisis, next generation ICT services are envisaged to 
help locate and support victims and responders. The system is based on cloud computing and ad-hoc 
networking, which, like Japan’s traditional Internet infrastructures, remained largely operational 
even in the immediate aftermath of the To¯hoku earthquake (Shaw 2011).
It is not yet clear in how far technologies have succeeded or failed to support coordination, infor-
mation and collaboration in the response efforts in Japan. Moreover, it is not clear whether tech-
nologies (or structural innovations) actually can help. The—under normal conditions!—highly 
complex practices of understanding, orchestrating and visualising needs and activities across dis-
tance and professional boundaries (Suchman 1997) may not be ‘stretchable’ beyond certain limits. 
However, while we wait for further evaluation reports, more general issues can and should be dis-
cussed. Repeated experience of the fragility of communications networks (and technology more 
generally) has inspired calls for ‘graceful augmentation’ of traditional emergency response practices 
and technologies (Jul 2007). Furthermore, there are fears that design and policy efforts to increase 
the effi ciency and security of normal mobile living, preparedness for crises and disaster response are 
part of a Faustian bargain where societies trade in the privacy and civil liberties needed for demo-
cratic governance (Elliott and Urry 2010). This could become another creeping but potentially 
major socio-cultural disaster that cannot be prevented by implementing more advanced technical 
mechanisms of managing access to personal data, because the social and material cultural practices 
involved are much too situated, complex and dynamic to be controlled (Nissenbaum 2009). Research 
and development around disaster response technologies can help address this socio-technical 
challenge by making innovation around next generation information technology subject to more 
informed public debate, and by enabling more informed holistic innovation and evaluation through 
collective experimentation (Bridge project). And people’s responses—especially the increasingly wide-
spread use of social media and open source community platforms—highlight that besides dangers, 
there are also opportunities arising from public socio-technical innovation in disaster coordination, 
information and collaboration.
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